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Anton Piller Orders or Search Orders

Federal Court of Australia explains Anton Piller oders

 1. This Practice Note supplements Order 25B relating to search orders (also known as Anton Piller orders, after Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55).

2. This Practice Note addresses (among other things) the Court's usual practice relating to the making of a search order and the usual terms of such an order. While a standard practice has benefits, this Practice Note and the example form of order annexed to it do not, and can not, limit the judicial discretion to make such order as is appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case.

3. Words and expressions in this Practice Note that are defined in Order 25B have the meanings given to them in that Order.

4. Ordinarily, a search order is made ex parte and compels the respondent to permit persons specified in the order ('search party') to enter premises and to search for, inspect, copy and remove the things described in the order. The order is designed to preserve important evidence pending the hearing and determination of the applicant's claim in a proceeding brought or to be brought by the applicant against the respondent or against another person. The order is an extraordinary remedy in that it is intrusive, potentially disruptive, and made ex parte and prior to judgment.

5. An example form of ex parte search order is annexed to this Practice Note (the footnotes and references to footnotes in the example form should not form part of the order as made). The example form may be adapted to meet the circumstances of the particular case. It contains provisions which are aimed at achieving the permissible objectives of a search order, while minimising the potential for disruption or damage to the respondent and for abuse of the Court's process.

6. The search party must include an independent solicitor who will supervise the search and a solicitor or solicitors representing the applicant. It may be necessary that it include other persons, such as an independent computer expert, and a person able to identify things being searched for if difficulties of identification may arise. Ordinarily, the search party should not include the applicant or the applicant's directors, officers, employees or partners or any other person associated with the applicant (other than the applicant's solicitor).

7. The order should be clear about the maximum number of persons permitted to be in the search party. The number of people in the search party should be as small as is reasonably practicable. The example form contemplates that they will be named in the order. This is desirable but if it is not possible the order should at least give a description of the class of person who will be there (e.g. 'one solicitor employed by A, B and Co').

8. The affidavits in support of an application for a search order should include the following information:

(a) a description of the things or the categories of things, in relation to which the order is sought;

(b) the address or location of any premises in relation to which the order is sought and whether they are private or business premises;

© why the order is sought, including why there is a real possibility that the things to be searched for will be destroyed or otherwise made unavailable for use in evidence before the court unless the order is made;

(d) the prejudice, loss or damage likely to be suffered by the applicant if the order is not made;

(e) the name, address, firm, and commercial litigation experience of an independent solicitor, ho consents to being appointed to serve the order, supervise its execution, and do such other things as the Court considers appropriate; and


(f) if the premises to be searched are or include residential premises, whether or not the applicant believes that the only occupant of the premises is likely to be:

(i) a female; or


(ii) a child under the age of 18; or


(iii) any other person ('vulnerable person') that a reasonable person would consider to be in a position of vulnerability because of that person's age, mental capacity, infirmity or English language ability; or


(iv) any combination of (i), (ii) and (iii), and any one or more of such persons.

9. If it is envisaged that specialised computer expertise may be required to search the respondent's computers for documents, or if the respondent's computers are to be imaged (i.e. hard drives are to be copied wholesale, thereby reproducing documents referred to in the order and other documents indiscriminately), special provision will need to be made, and an independent computer specialist will need to be appointed who should be required to give undertakings to the Court.

10. The applicant's solicitor must undertake to the Court to pay the reasonable costs and disbursements of the independent solicitor and of any independent computer expert.

11. The independent solicitor is an important safeguard against abuse of the order. The independent solicitor must not be a member or employee of the applicant's firm of solicitors. The independent solicitor should be a solicitor experienced in commercial litigation, preferably in the execution of search orders. The Law Society/Institute has been requested to maintain a list of solicitors who have indicated willingness to be appointed as an independent solicitor for the purpose of executing search orders, but it is not only persons on such a list who may be appointed. The responsibilities of the independent solicitor are important and ordinarily include the following:

(a) serve the order, the application for it, the affidavits relied on in support of the application, and the originating process;

(b) offer to explain, and, if the offer is accepted, explain the terms of the search order to the respondent;

© explain to the respondent that he or she has the right to obtain legal advice;

(d) supervise the carrying out of the order;

(e) before removing things from the premises, make a list of them, allow the respondent a reasonable opportunity to check the correctness of the list, sign the list, and provide the parties with a copy of the list;

(f) take custody of all things removed from the premises until further order of the Court;

(g) if the independent solicitor considers it necessary to remove a computer from the premises for safekeeping or for the purpose of copying its contents electronically or printing out information in documentary form, remove the computer from the premises for that purpose, and return the computer to the premises within any time prescribed by the order together with a list of any documents that have been copied or printed out;

(h) submit a written report to the Court within the time prescribed by the order as to the execution of the order; and


(i) attend the hearing on the return date of the application, and have available to be brought to the Court all things that were removed from the premises. on the return date the independent solicitor may be required to release material in his or her custody which has been removed from the respondent's premises or to provide information to the Court, and may raise any issue before the Court as to execution of the order.

 12. Ordinarily, the applicant is not permitted, without the leave of the Court, to inspect things removed from the premises or copies of them, or to be given any information about them
 by members of the search party.

13. Ordinarily, a search order should be served between 9:00am and 2:00pm on a business day in order to permit the respondent more readily to obtain legal advice. However, there may be circumstances in which such a restriction is not appropriate.

14. A search order must not be executed at the same time as the execution of a search warrant by the police or by a regulatory authority.

15. If the premises are or include residential premises and the applicant is aware that when service of the order is effected the only occupant of the residential premises is likely to be any one or more of a female, a child under the age of 18, or a vulnerable person, the Court will give consideration to whether:

(a) if the occupants are likely to include a female or child, the independent solicitor should be a woman or the search party should otherwise include a woman; and
 
 (b) if the occupants are likely to include a vulnerable person, the search party should include a person capable of addressing the relevant vulnerability.

16. Any period during which the respondent is to be restrained from informing any other person (other than for the purposes of obtaining legal advice) of the existence of the search order should be as short as possible and not extend beyond 4:30pm on the Return Date.

17. At the inter partes hearing of the application on the return date, the Court will consider the following issues:-

(a) what is to happen to any things removed from the premises or to any copies which have been made;
 
 (b) how any commercial confidentiality of the respondent is to be maintained;
 
 © any claim of privilege by the respondent;
 
 (d) any application by a party; and
 
 (e) any issue raised by the independent solicitor.

 ;18. Appropriate undertakings to the Court will be required of the applicant, the applicant's solicitor and the independent solicitor, as conditions of the making of the search order. The undertakings required of the applicant will normally include the Court's usual undertaking as to damages. The applicant's solicitor's undertaking includes an undertaking not to disclose to the applicant any information that the solicitor has acquired during or as a result of execution of the search order, without the leave of the Court. Release from this undertaking in whole or in part may be sought on the return date.19. If it is demonstrated that the applicant has or may have insufficient assets within the jurisdiction of the Court to provide substance for the usual undertaking as to damages, the applicant may be required to provide security for the due performance of that undertaking. The security may, for example, take the form of a bank's irrevocable undertaking to pay or a payment into Court. The example form of search order contains provision for an irrevocable undertaking.

20. An applicant ex parte for a search order is under a duty to the Court to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to the Court. This includes disclosure of possible defences known to the applicant and of any financial information which may cast doubt on the applicant's ability to meet the usual undertaking as to damages from assets within Australia.

21. The order to be served should be endorsed with a notice which meets the requirements of [e.g. FCR O 37 r 2, NSW UCPR Pt 40 r 7, Victoria SCR O 66 r 10].

22. A search order is subject to the Court's adjudication of any claim of privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege against self-incrimination is available to individuals but not to corporations. The Court will not make an order reducing or limiting that privilege in circumstances where the legislature has not indicated that it may do so.

Also see postings under comments on: Anton Piller orders (search orders), sample of Anton Piller Orders, Anton Piller case histories and Mareva orders.

Warning - these type of orders can be very expensive to obtain and execute. They are hardly used in Family Law. Really only suitable for big money cases. You really need to know what you are doing!

Note: Mareva orders(stops the selling of assets) are easier to obtain and are used in Family Law.







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Last edit: by monteverdi


Executive Member of SRL-Resources, the Family Law People on the site (Look for the Avatars).   Be mindful what you post in the public areas. 

Example Form of Search Order(Anton Piller)

PENAL NOTICE
TO: [name of person against whom the order is made]

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THE ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR  

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU TO ABSTAIN FROM DOING,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.


TO: [name of person against whom the order is made]

This is a 'search order' made against you on [insert date] by Justice [insert name of Judge] at a hearing without notice to you after the Court was given the undertakings set out in Schedule B to this order and after the Court read the affidavits listed in Schedule C to this order.

THE COURT ORDERS:

INTRODUCTION

1.

(a) the application for this order is made returnable immediately.

(b) the time for service of the application, supporting affidavits and originating process is abridged and service is to be effected by [insert time and date].

2. Subject to the next paragraph, this order has effect up to and including [insert date] ('the Return Date'). on the Return Date at [insert time] am/pm there will be a further hearing in respect of this order before Justice [insert name of Judge].

3. You may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this order; including, if necessary, by telephone to the judge referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph (phone No.      &nbsp or to the Duty Judge (phone No.     &nbsp.

4. This order may be served only between [insert time] am/pm and [insert time] am/pm [on a business day]

5. In this order:

(a) 'applicant' means the person who applied for this order, and if there is more than one applicant, includes all the applicants.
 
 (b) 'independent computer expert' means the person (if any) identified as the independent computer expert in the search party referred to in Schedule A to this order.
 
 © 'independent solicitor' means the person identified as the independent solicitor in the search party referred to in Schedule A to this order.
 
 (d) 'listed thing' means any thing referred to in Schedule A to this order.
 
 (e) 'premises' means the premises and any of the premises identified in Schedule A to this order, including any vehicles and vessels that are under the respondent's control on or about the premises or that are otherwise identified in Schedule A.
 
 (f) 'search party' means the persons identified or described as constituting the search party in Schedule A to this order.
 
 (g) 'thing' includes a document.
 
 (h) 'you', where there is more than one of you, includes all of you and includes you if you are a corporation.
 
 (i) any requirement that something be done in your presence means:

( A ) in the presence of you or of one of the persons described in (6) below; or
 ( B ) if there is more than one of you, in the presence of each of you, or, in relation to each of you, in the presence of one of the persons described in (6) below.

6. This order must be complied with by you by:

(a) yourself; or


(b) any director, officer, partner, employee or agent of yourself; or


© any other person having responsible control of the premises.

7. This order must be served by, and be executed under the supervision of, the independent solicitor.

ENTRY, SEARCH AND REMOVAL

8. Subject to paragraphs 10 to 20 below, upon service of this order you must permit members of the search party to enter the premises so that they can carry out the search and other activities referred to in this order.

9. Having permitted members of the search party to enter the premises, you must:-

(a) permit them to leave and re-enter the premises on the same and the following day until the search and other activities referred to in this order are complete;

(b) permit them to search for and inspect the listed things and to make or obtain a copy, photograph, film, sample, test or other record of the listed things;

© disclose to them the whereabouts of all the listed things in the respondent's possession, custody or power, whether at the premises or otherwise;

(d) disclose to them the whereabouts of all computers, computer disks and electronic information storage devices or systems at the premises in which any documents among the listed things are or may be stored, located or recorded and cause and permit those documents to be printed out;

(e) do all things necessary to enable them to access the listed things, including opening or providing keys to locks and enabling them to access and operate computers and providing them with all necessary passwords;

(f) permit the independent solicitor to remove from the premises into the independent solicitor's custody:

(i) the listed things or things which reasonably appear to the independent solicitor to be the listed things and any things the subject of dispute as to whether they are listed things; and


(ii) the copies, photographs, films, samples, tests, other records and printed out documents referred to above; and


(g) permit the independent computer expert (if there is one) to search any computer and make a copy or digital copy of any computer hard drive and permit the independent computer expert (if any) or the independent solicitor to remove any computer hard drive and computer from the premises as set out in paragraphs 20 and 21 below.

RESTRICTIONS on ENTRY, SEARCH AND REMOVAL

10. This order may not be executed at the same time as a search warrant (or similar process) is executed by the police or by a regulatory authority.

11. You are not required to permit anyone to enter the premises until:

(a) the independent solicitor serves you with copies of this order and any affidavits referred to in Schedule C (confidential exhibits, if any, need not be served until further order of the Court); and


(b) you are given an opportunity to read this order and, if you so request, the independent solicitor explains the terms of this order to you.

12. Before permitting entry to the premises by anyone other than the independent solicitor, you, for a time (not exceeding two hours from the time of service or such longer period as the independent solicitor may permit):-

(a) may seek legal advice;

(b) may ask the Court to vary or discharge this order;

© (provided you are not a corporation) may gather together any things which you believe may tend to incriminate you or make you liable to a civil penalty and hand them to the independent solicitor in (if you wish) a sealed envelope or container; and


(d) may gather together any documents that passed between you and your lawyers for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or that are otherwise subject to legal professional privilege or client legal privilege, and hand them to the independent solicitor in (if you wish) a sealed envelope or container.

13. Subject to paragraph 22 below, the independent solicitor must not inspect or permit to be inspected by anyone, including the applicant and the applicant's solicitors, any thing handed to the independent solicitor in accordance with subparagraphs 12© and (d) above and the independent solicitor must deliver it to the Court at or prior to the hearing on the Return Date.

14. During any period referred to in para 12 above, you must:

(a) inform and keep the independent solicitor informed of the steps being taken;

(b) permit the independent solicitor to enter the premises but not to start the search;

© not disturb or remove any listed things; and


(d) comply with the terms of paragraphs 25 and 26 below.

15. Any thing the subject of a dispute as to whether it is a listed thing must promptly be handed by you to the independent solicitor for safekeeping pending resolution of the dispute or further order of the Court.

16. Before removing any listed things from the premises (other than things referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph), the independent solicitor must supply a list of them to you, give you a reasonable time to check the correctness of the list, and give you and the applicant's solicitors a copy of the list signed by the independent solicitor.

17. The premises must not be searched, and things must not be removed from the premises, except in the presence of you or of a person who appears to the independent solicitor to be your director, officer, partner, employee, agent or other person acting on your behalf or on your instructions.

18. If the independent solicitor is satisfied that full compliance with the immediately preceding paragraph is not reasonably practicable, the independent solicitor may permit the search to proceed and the listed things to be removed without full compliance.

19. The applicant's solicitors and the independent solicitor must not allow the applicant in person to inspect or have copies of any thing removed from the premises nor communicate to the applicant information about its contents or about anything observed at the premises until 4:30pm on the return date or other time fixed by further order of the Court.

COMPUTERS

20.

(a) If it is expected that a computer will be searched, the search party must include a computer expert who is independent of the applicant and of the applicant's solicitors ('the independent computer expert').

(b) Any search of a computer must be carried out only by the independent computer expert.

© The independent computer expert may make a copy or digital copy of the computer hard drive and remove that copy or digital copy from the premises.

(d) The independent computer expert may search the computer or the copy or digital copy of the computer hard drive at the premises and/or away from the premises for listed things and may copy the listed things electronically or in hard copy or both.

(e) The independent computer expert must as soon as practicable and, in any event, prior to the hearing on the return date, deliver the copy or digital copy of the computer hard drive and all electronic and hard copies of listed things to the independent solicitor, together with a report of what the independent computer expert has done including a list of such electronic and hard copies.

(f) The independent solicitor must, at or prior to the hearing on the return date, deliver to the Court all things received from the independent computer expert and serve a copy of the latter's report on the parties.

(g) If no independent computer expert has been appointed, but the independent solicitor considers it necessary to remove a computer from the premises for safekeeping or for the purpose of copying its contents electronically and printing out information in documentary form, the independent solicitor may remove the computer from the premises for that purpose and cause that purpose to be achieved.

21.

(a) Unless you are a corporation, you are entitled to object to paragraphs 20(b) to (f) on the ground that they might tend to incriminate you or make you liable to a civil penalty.

(b) You are also entitled to object to paragraphs 20(b) to (f) on the ground that the computer contains material that is otherwise privileged.

© Upon communicating any objection under para (a) or (b) to the independent solicitor, paragraphs 20(b) to (f) become inoperative to the extent that you have objected to them. In that event, if the applicant's solicitor communicates to the independent solicitor that the applicant proposes to contest the objection:

(i) the independent computer expert shall remove the computer hard drive (or, if that is not practicable, the computer) from the premises and deliver it into the custody of the independent solicitor who shall deliver it to the Court at or prior to the Return Date.

(ii) on the Return Date or on another date, the applicant may apply to the Court for orders to similar effect as paragraphs 20(b) to (f) and if you object, the Court may adjudicate upon your objection.

INSPECTION

22. Prior to the Return Date, you or your solicitor or representative shall be entitled, in the presence of the independent solicitor, to inspect any thing removed from the premises and to:

(a) make copies of the same; and


(b) provide the independent solicitor with a signed list of things which are claimed to be privileged or confidential and which you claim ought not to be inspected by the applicant.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

23. Subject to paragraph 24 below, you must:

(a) at or before the further hearing on the Return Date (or within such further time as the Court may allow) to the best of your ability inform the applicant in writing as to:

(i) the location of the listed things;

(ii) the name and address of everyone who has supplied you, or offered to supply you, with any listed thing;

(iii) the name and address of every person to whom you have supplied, or offered to supply, any listed thing; and


(iv) details of the dates and quantities of every such supply and offer.

(b) within [   ] working days after being served with this order, make and serve on the applicant an affidavit setting out the above information.

24.

(a) This paragraph (24) applies if you are not a corporation and you wish to object that compliance with paragraph 23 may tend to incriminate you or make you liable to a civil penalty.

(b) This paragraph (24) also applies if you are a corporation and all of the persons who are able to comply with paragraph 23 on your behalf and with whom you have been able to communicate, wish to object that compliance may tend to incriminate them or make them liable to a civil penalty.

© You must, at or before the further hearing on the Return Date (or within such further time as the Court may allow), notify the applicant in writing that you or all the persons referred to in (b) wish to take such objection and identify the extent of the objection.

(d) If you give such notice, you need comply with paragraph 23 only to the extent, if any, that it is possible to do so without disclosure of the material in respect of which the objection is taken.

(e) If you give such notice, the Court may give directions as to the filing and service of affidavits setting out such matters as you or the persons referred to in (b) wish to place before the Court in support of the objection.

PROHIBITED ACTS

25. Except for the sole purpose of obtaining legal advice, you must not, until 4:30pm on the Return Date, directly or indirectly inform any person of this proceeding or of the contents of this order, or tell any person that a proceeding has been or may be brought against you by the applicant.

26. Until 4:30pm on the Return Date you must not destroy, tamper with, cancel or part with possession, power, custody or control of the listed things otherwise than in accordance with the terms of this order or further order of the Court.

COSTS

27. The costs of this application are reserved to the Judge hearing the application on the Return Date.

 
 
SCHEDULE A
Premises

The premises located at [insert address or addresses] including any vehicle or vehicles under the respondent's control on or about those premises.

Listed Things

1.

2.

3.



Search Party

1. The independent solicitor: [insert name and address]

2. The applicant's solicitor or solicitors:

(a) [insert name and address] [or description e.g. a partner or employed solicitor of A, B and Co].

(b) [insert name and address] [or description e.g. a partner or employed solicitor of A, B and Co].

© [insert name and address] [or description e.g. a partner or employed solicitor of A, B and Co].

3. Other members of the search party:-

(a) [insert name and address] in the capacity of [e.g. an independent computer expert]

(b) [insert name and address] in the capacity of [insert capacity]




SCHEDULE B
UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN TO THE COURT
Undertakings given to the Court by the applicant:-
  (1) The applicant undertakes to submit to such order (if any) as the Court may consider to be just for the payment of compensation (to be assessed by the Court or as it may direct) to any person (whether or not a party) affected by the operation of the order.

(2) The applicant will not, without leave of the Court, use any information, document or thing obtained as a result of the execution of this order for the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, either within or outside Australia, other than this proceeding.

(3) The applicant will not inform any other person of the existence of this proceeding except for the purposes of this proceeding until after 4:30pm on the Return Date.

(4) If the applicant has not already done so, as soon as practicable the applicant will file a notice of motion for hearing on the Return Date and an originating process [in the form of the draft produced to the Court].

[(5) The applicant will insure the things removed from the premises against loss or damage for an amount that reasonably appears to the applicant to be their full value.

[(6) The applicant will:

(a) on or before [insert date] cause a written irrevocable undertaking to pay in the sum of $[insert amount] to be issued from a bank with a place of business within Australia, in respect of any order the Court may make referred to in the undertaking as to damages contained in paragraph (1) above; and


(b) immediately upon issue of the irrevocable undertaking to pay, cause a copy of it to be served on the respondent.]

Undertakings given to the Court by the applicant's solicitor

(1) The applicant's solicitor will pay the reasonable costs and disbursements of the independent solicitor and of any independent computer expert.

(2) The applicant's solicitor will provide to the independent solicitor for service on the respondent copies of the following documents:

(a) this order;
 
 (b) the application for this order for hearing on the Return Date;
 
 © the following material in so far as it was relied on by the applicant at the hearing when the order was made:

(i) affidavits (or draft affidavits)

(ii) exhibits capable of being copied (other than confidential exhibits);

(iii) any written submission; and


(iv) any other document that was provided to the Court.

(d) a transcript, or, if none is available, a note, of any exclusively oral allegation of fact that was made and of any exclusively oral submission that was put, to the Court; and


(e) the originating process, or, if none was filed, any draft originating process produced to the Court.

(3) The applicant's solicitor will answer to the best of his or her ability any question as to whether a particular thing is a listed thing.

(4) The applicant's solicitor will use his or her best endeavours to act in conformity with the order and to ensure that the order is executed in a courteous and orderly manner and in a manner that minimises disruption to the respondent.

(5) The applicant's solicitor will not, without leave of the Court, use any information, document or thing obtained as a result of the execution of this order for the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, either within or outside Australia, other than this proceeding.

(6) The applicant's solicitor will not inform any other person of the existence of this proceeding except for the purposes of this proceeding until after 4:30pm on the Return Date.

(7) The applicant's solicitor will not disclose to the applicant any information that the solicitor acquires during or as a result of execution of the search order, without the leave of the Court.

(8) The applicant's solicitor will use best endeavours to follow all directions of the independent solicitor.

Undertakings given to the Court by the independent solicitor

(1) The independent solicitor will use his or her best endeavours to serve the respondent with this order and the other documents referred to in undertaking (2) of the above undertakings by the applicant's solicitor or solicitors.

(2) Before entering the premises, the independent solicitor will:-

(a) offer to explain the terms and effect of the search order to the person served with the order and, if the offer is accepted, do so; and


(b) inform the respondent of his or her right to take legal advice.

(3) Subject to undertaking (4) below, the independent solicitor will retain custody of all things removed from the premises by the independent solicitor pursuant to this order until delivery to the Court or further order of the Court.

(4) At or before the hearing on the Return Date, the independent solicitor will provide a written report on the carrying out of the order to the Court and provide a copy to the applicant's solicitors and to the respondent or the respondent's solicitors. The report will attach a copy of any list made pursuant to the order and a copy of any report received from an independent computer expert.

(5) The independent solicitor will use best endeavours to ensure that members of the search party act in conformity with the order and that the order is executed in a courteous and orderly manner and in a manner that minimises disruption to the respondent, and will give such reasonable directions to other members of the search party as are necessary or convenient for the execution of the order.

(6) The independent solicitor will not, without leave of the Court, use any information, document or thing obtained as a result of the execution of this order for the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, either within or outside Australia, other than this proceeding.

(7) The independent solicitor will not inform any other person of the existence of this proceeding except for the purposes of this proceeding until after 4:30pm on the Return Date.

Undertakings given to the Court by the independent computer expert

(1) The independent computer expert will use his or her best endeavours to act in conformity with the order and to ensure that the order, so far as it concerns the independent computer expert, is execute in a courteous and orderly manner and in a manner that minimises disruption to the respondent.

(2) The independent computer expert will not, without leave of the Court, use any information, document or thing obtained as a result of the execution of this order for the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, either within or outside Australia, other than this proceeding.

(3) The independent computer expert will not inform any other person of the existence of this proceeding except for the purposes of this proceeding until after 4:30pm on the Return Date.

(4) The independent computer expert will use best endeavours to follow all directions of the independent solicitor.




SCHEDULE C
AFFIDAVITS RELIED on
Name of Deponent
Date affidavit made
(1)



(2)



(3)



NAME AND ADDRESS OF APPLICANT'S SOLICITORS

The Applicant's solicitors are: [Insert name, address, reference, fax and telephone numbers both in and out office hours].







Footnotes:

[1] Normally the order should be served between 9:00am and 2:00pm on a business day to enable the respondent more readily to obtain legal advice.

[2] Depending on the nature of the things likely to be removed and their likely value, and the likely particular risks of their being lost or damaged, this undertaking or a more elaborate one may be required.

[3] See Practice Note paragraph 19.







Executive Member of SRL-Resources, the Family Law People on the site (Look for the Avatars).   Be mindful what you post in the public areas. 

Comments on Anton Piller orders

Under the Australian legal system the Anton Piller Order is to enable the applicant to enter premises and seize evidence with out prior warning.

It is really used in business cases but can be used in a Family Law Act dispute, especially under a section 79 issue where there is a business.

Anton Piller came about after the Anton Piller KG Vs vs Manufacturing Processes Limited [1976] Ch 55, case.

Lord Dennning had this to say about them:
"It does not authorise the plaintiff's solicitors or anyone else to enter the defendants' premises against their will. It does not authorise the breaking down of any doors, nor the slipping in by a back door, nor getting in by an open door or window … The plaintiffs must get the defendants' permission. But it does do this: It brings pressure on the defendants to give permission. It does more. It actually orders them to give permission - with, I suppose, the result that if they do not give permission, they are guilty of contempt of court."
As you can see - very powerful orders.
 

Executive Member of SRL-Resources, the Family Law People on the site (Look for the Avatars).   Be mindful what you post in the public areas. 
From:
The Family Law Handbook - Redfern Legal Centre

"The court may grant an 'Anton Pillar' order allowing entrance onto property, search and the seizure of material the applicant believes would otherwise be removed, destroyed or altered, causing them some sort of harm (Family Law Rule 14.04). Such applications ar uncommon in Family Law."

From:
Family Law Preparation & Strategy, by David Berman

"THE ANTON PILLER ORDER
Order 21 enables the Court to make orders authorising without notice the entry upon premises of a respondent party or indeed even a third party where it is necessary to sieze documents or property to preserve them. To the extent that there is any dispute as to the Court's power, the matter was dealt with conclusively in Re Z at p. 83,246 where the Court approved of the order of Lindenmeyer J. in Talbot (1995) FLC 92-586. The trial judge relied upon the inherent powers of the Court and s.34 of the Family Law Act in making such an order. Before an Anton Piller order can be made, three pre-conditions need to be satisfied:
1.   A strong prima facie case.
2.   The potential for damages must be serious for the applicant.
3.   Clear evidence that the incriminating documents or things are in the possession of
   the defendant and that they may be destroyed.

In my experience, the Court, particularly where the application is directed against third parties, will be most reluctant to make such an order."

Note:  The leave of the court is required and the process of satisfying the requirements would be demanding.

Mareva Injunctions

The comment on Mareva injunctions pursuant to s114(3) are not easy, yet possible. One out of two was a reasonable result in seeking to arrest a scheme to defeat one's claims. It is necessary to establish an entitlement for the claim. That the scheme to defeat exists, and, that on the balance of convenience it is fair and just. The actual arguments would vary according to the matter.

It was an interlocutory proceeding, wherein the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source. That interprets in reality to an inability to test the evidence in an affidavit. Also there is a 2 hour rule that is allowed for hearing the matter before a Judgicial Registrar. If a scheme to defeat is established it could well have ramnifications in the substantive Final Orders trial.

Last edit: by verdad


What is done for you, let it be done, what you must do, be sure you do it, as the wise person does today that what the fool will do in three days - Buddha

Talbot and Talbot - Application for Anton Piller orders.

In the marriage of TALBOT, K and TALBOT, AA(1995) FLC ¶92-586


Family Court of Australia at Brisbane

Judgment delivered 16 November 1994

Family law – Property – Application for Anton Piller orders – Essential preconditions for making of order – Whether extremely strong prima facie case – Whether damage, potential or actual, very serious for applicant – Whether clear evidence that defendants have in their possession incriminating documents or things, and a real possibility that they may destroy such material before any application inter partes can be made.

This was an ex parte application by the wife for Anton Piller orders against two natural persons and three corporations. The natural persons were the husband and a solicitor who were both directors of, and shareholders in, each of the three corporations.

In support of her application the wife said that she intended to seek substantive orders setting aside consent orders on the grounds of fraud and/or abuse of the Court's process. She alleged that she had been induced to enter into an agreement which formed the basis of the consent orders and to consent to the orders themselves by the fraud of the husband and two of the corporations in falsely representing to her, her legal advisers and the Court that particular share allotments had taken place.

Held: orders made against the husband and two corporations but not against the solicitor and one corporation.

1. By virtue either of sec 34(1) of the Family Law Act or of the Family Court's inherent jurisdiction as defined by Gibbs CJ in Re Ross Jones; ex parte Green (1984) FLC ¶91-555; (1984) 156 CLR 185, the Court has the necessary jurisdiction and power to make an ``Anton Piller'' type order in an appropriate case in aid of its jurisdiction in substantive proceedings properly invoked or intended to be invoked by an application filed or undertaken to be filed in the court.

2. The wife's proposed application disclosed a reasonable and probable cause of action at least against the husband and one corporation (QCMM), of fraud inducing her to abandon her proceedings to enforce earlier consent orders and to enter into less favourable (to her) consent orders.


3. The Court was also satisfied, at a prima facie level, that if it ultimately found that such fraud was committed by the husband and QCMM and that the wife was induced by it to enter into the consent orders, the Court would have jurisdiction to set aside those consent orders as against those parties at least, pursuant either to sec 79A(1)(a) or to its inherent jurisdiction to set aside its own orders obtained by fraud.

4. There are three essential preconditions for the making of an ``Anton Piller'' order (Ormrod LJ in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Limited & Ors (1976) Ch 55 at p 62). First, there must be an extremely strong prima facie case. Secondly, the damage, potential or actual, must be very serious for the applicant. Thirdly, there must be clear evidence that the defendants have in their possession incriminating documents or things, and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such material before any application inter partes can be made.

5. In this case the solicitor and one of the corporations were not respondents to the wife's proposed substantive application, nor was either a party to the consent orders. The Court was not referred to any authority which established that an ``Anton Piller'' order has ever been or may be made against someone who is not and will not be a defendant in the existing or proposed substantive proceedings. To grant such an order against a non-party could be to introduce an unwarranted extension of the field of operation of a very Draconian procedure.

6. As for the husband, QCMM and the third corporation, the Court was satisfied that there was clear evidence that each of them had in his or its possession, custody or control documents which were likely to support the wife's allegations of fraud in relation to the share allotment. The Court was also satisfied that there was a real possibility that if orders against the three respondents were not made they might destroy or otherwise dispose of such documents once they were served with the wife's proposed application and before normal inter partes discovery could be obtained in those proceedings.


Appearances: Mr R Galloway of counsel (instructed by Carter Newell) appeared for the wife.

Before: Lindenmayer J.

Full text of judgment below

Lindenmayer J: This matter comes before me by way of ex parte application by the wife for orders of a kind commonly referred to these days as ``Anton Piller'' orders against two natural persons and three corporations. The natural persons against whom the orders are sought are the husband who is the former husband of the wife, and one S who is a solicitor of the Supreme Court of Queensland and, like the husband, a director of each of the corporations against which orders are also sought. Both the husband and S, either directly or indirectly (that is through other corporations) shareholders in each of the corporations against which orders are sought. Those corporations are Queensland Coal Mine Management Pty Ltd (``QCMM''), Taitolio Pty Ltd (``Taitolio''), and Kiskin Pty Ltd (``Kiskin'').

The background to the current application is long and complex and I do not propose to recite it in any detail. That history is set out in part in my judgment of 23 June, 1993 given in earlier proceedings in this court involving the husband, the wife, QCMM, and others whom it is not necessary to identify for present purposes. That judgment is reported as Talbot and Talbot (1992) 15 FamLR 719, and reference may be made to it for a summary of the relevant facts up to that date. The subsequent relevant factual history is recited in the affidavit of the wife's solicitor, Patrick Gerald Mead, sworn on 5 October, 1994 and filed by my leave on 10 October. I accept, for the purposes of this judgment, that factual history as recited in that affidavit, supported as it is by the numerous annexures thereto.

The current application first came before me on 7 October when, after reading the application and affidavit material sought to be filed on the wife's behalf and hearing certain submissions from the wife's counsel. I stood it over until 10 October to allow counsel for the wife to prepare a fresh draft of the orders sought to take account of certain intimations which I gave in the course of the proceedings on 7 October, and also to enable me to give consideration to some of the legal issues which arose in the course of his submissions.

[81804]
When the matter came before me again on 10 October, I intimated that I was not then prepared to make the orders sought on behalf of the wife in the draft then presented to me by counsel for the wife because the precise form of the foreshadowed substantive application to be made by the wife, in aid of which the ``Anton Piller'' orders were sought, had not been settled, and I considered that, as the issues which that foreshadowed application raised were potentially complex, I should see the final form of that application before deciding whether the ``Anton Piller'' orders sought, or any such orders, should be made. I therefore gave formal leave to the wife to file and read, and to make instanta, the application for the ``Anton Piller'' orders, and to file and read the two separate supporting affidavits of Mr Mead sworn on 5 October and 6 October, 1994 respectively. I then adjourned the application for further hearing before me on a date to be fixed, at the request of the wife's solicitors, by arrangement with my associate.

Pursuant to that order, and arrangements subsequently made with my associate, the matter was relisted before me yesterday when counsel for the wife produced a draft form of the substantive application to be filed on the wife's behalf seeking orders setting aside, on the grounds of fraud and/or abuse of the court's process, consent orders of this court made on 15 September, 1992 in proceedings between the wife and the husband to which QCMM and Taitolio, amongst others, were also parties, or alternatively orders setting aside, on similar grounds, an earlier consent order of this court made on 18 November, 1991 in proceedings between the husband and wife brought pursuant to s. 79 of the Family Law Act.

Counsel for the wife also sought and obtained my leave to file and read a further affidavit of the wife's solicitor, Mr Mead, sworn on 28 October wherein he gives to the court certain undertakings which, in terms of the draft orders sought by the wife, would be required to be given by her solicitors as a condition precedent to the making of those orders. After hearing further submissions from counsel for the wife, I then adjourned the matter over to this morning for further consideration and the delivery of my judgment on the application.

The superior courts of general common law and equitable jurisdiction, both in England and in Australia have, with increasing frequency since the mid-1970s, recognised the existence of and, in appropriate cases, exercised a jurisdiction to make, upon ex parte application by a plaintiff in an existing or intended action, orders obliging the defendant or proposed defendant to permit certain of the plaintiff's representatives to enter the defendant's premises to search for, inspect and remove for safe keeping (or take copies of) documents or things which are alleged by the plaintiff to be vital evidence in the action, where the plaintiff satisfies the court that there is a real risk that unless this is done the defendant will either destroy or hide the documents, so as to prevent their being placed before the court as soon as he or she gets wind of the plaintiff's action. The underlying rationale for the existence of jurisdiction to make such draconian orders is that the court must have an inherent jurisdiction to ensure that its proceedings are not rendered nugatory by the misbehaviour of a defendant or proposed defendant. Following the celebrated decision of the English Court of Appeal in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Limited & Ors (1976) Ch. 55, such orders have come almost universally to be known as ``Anton Piller'' orders.

In Australia such orders are now relatively commonly made in the Supreme Courts of the various States and in the Federal Court of Australia. I am not aware of, and have not been referred to, any reported decision of this court in which such an order has been made but I have reason to believe that such an order has been made in at least one case in another registry of this court.

Although this court is, by s. 21(2) of the Family Law Act, a ``superior court of record'', it is not a court of general common law or equitable jurisdiction (except pursuant to the cross-vesting legislation of the Commonwealth and the States), but a court of limited statutory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it has some inherent jurisdiction although that inherent jurisdiction (absent cross-vesting) is less extensive than that of superior courts of general jurisdiction: see Taylor v Taylor (1979) FLA (1979) 143 CLR 1, and Re Ross Jones; ex parte Green (1984) 156 CLR 185. In the latter case, at 79,487 of the Family Law Cases report, the then Gibbs, C.J. said this:

``Such inherent jurisdiction as the Family Court may have could not go beyond


protecting its function as a Court constituted with the limited jurisdiction afforded by the Act…''A potential statutory source of jurisdiction for this court to make ``Anton Piller'' type orders is s. 34(1) of the Act which provides:

``The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, and to issue… writs of such kinds, as the Court considers appropriate.''

In my view, by virtue either of that subsection or of its inherent jurisdiction as defined by Gibbs, C.J. in Re Ross Jones; ex parte Green (supra), this court has the necessary jurisdiction and power to make an ``Anton Piller'' type order in an appropriate case in aid of its jurisdiction in substantive proceedings properly invoked or intended to be invoked by an application filed or undertaken to be filed in the court.

In this case the wife, by her counsel, has undertaken to file forthwith on or before 10 am on Friday next, an application substantially in the form of the draft document produced by her counsel yesterday and marked as exhibit 1 in these proceedings. By that draft application she will seek, as I have already indicated, substantive orders setting aside the consent orders of this court made on 15 September, 1992 on the grounds of fraud and/or abuse of the court's process, and the particulars of the fraud relied upon are, I believe, sufficiently particularised in that draft pleading.

Essentially what the wife alleges in that pleading is that she was induced to enter into the agreement which formed the basis of those consent orders, and to consent to the orders themselves, by the fraud of the husband, QCMM and Taitolio in falsely representing to her, her legal advisers and this court, on and before 22 June, 1992, that on 5 June, 1992 QCMM had allotted an additional 40,000 shares to certain parties other than Taitolio, which allotment, if it had in fact taken place, would have reduced the shareholding of Taitolio in QCMM from about 28 per cent to.6829 per cent, and thus so diminished the value of Taitolio (through its shareholding in QCMM) as to render valueless the security which the wife held over Taitolio for the performance of the husband's obligations to the wife under earlier consent orders of 18 November, 1991 which she was then attempting to enforce. It was, at least in part, upon the basis that that allotment had taken place that, on 23 June, 1992, I refused to grant to the wife an interlocutory injunction to restrain QCMM from making a further allotment of shares which it had signified an intention to make: see Talbot and Talbot (supra).

The wife further alleges that, but for that false representation, she would not have entered into the consent orders of 15 September, 1992, the overall effect of which was to reduce the amount payable to her by the husband under the earlier consent orders by some $360,000, but would have proceeded with her proceedings to enforce the earlier orders (which included applications under s. 85 of the Act to set aside various transactions, including the supposed share allotment of 5 June, 1992). She further alleges that the husband represented to her, prior to the making of the second consent orders of 15 September, 1992, that he was unable to pay the sum provided for in the earlier consent orders, namely $900,000. Although she does not allege in her pleading that that representation was fraudulent, there is evidence in the affidavit of Mr Mead of 5 October from which an inference of fraud by the husband in making that representation might possibly be drawn.

Finally, for present purposes, she further alleges in that pleading that the other corporate parties to the consent orders of 15 September, 1992, which were all parties to the enforcement proceedings which were settled by those orders and are all named as respondents to her proposed application, exhibit 1, through their respective public officers knew or ought to have known that the representations referred to in the pleading were not true. In this respect, it is perhaps instructive to note that the agreement of 11 September, 1992 (annexure D to Mr Mead's said affidavit) which formed the basis of the consent orders of 15 September, 1992, was signed on behalf of each of the corporate respondents to those proceedings, other than Taitolio (which was, at that time, in receivership at the instigation of QCMM) by S, who was, at all relevant times, a shareholder and director of both QCMM and Taitolio and who was the author, as director of QCMM, of the document which is annexure N to Mr Mead's said affidavit.

In my opinion, the wife's proposed application, exhibit 1, whilst perhaps not entirely beyond criticism, does disclose a


reasonable and probable cause of action against at least the husband and QCMM, of fraud inducing the wife to abandon her proceedings to enforce the earlier consent orders and to enter into the less favourable (to her) consent orders of 15 September, 1992.In my further opinion, the evidence of Mr Mead contained in his affidavit of 5 October, including the annexures thereto, does establish a strong prima facie case of fraud by at least the husband and QCMM in relation to two matters, namely the supposed allotment, on 5 June, 1992 of 40,000 shares in QCMM (which allotment it is now clear did not in fact occur) and the extent of the husband's earnings from QCMM at the time of the 15 September, 1992 consent orders (and his consequent capacity to meet his obligations under the earlier consent orders).

I am also satisfied, at a prima facie level, that if the court ultimately finds that such fraud was committed by the husband and QCMM, and that the wife was induced by it to enter into the consent orders of 15 September, 1992, as she alleges, this court will have jurisdiction to set aside those consent orders as against those parties at least, either pursuant to s. 79A(1)(a) of the Act, or pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction to set aside its own orders obtained by fraud. As to the latter, see AMEIU & Ors v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd & Ors (1986) 65 ALR 683 at 688; McHarg v Woods Radio Pty Ltd (1948) VLR 496; Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534; Boughen v Abel (1987) 1 Qd.R. 138; and both Taylor v Taylor and Re Ross Jones; ex parte Green (supra).

Having made those findings in relation to the prospective merits of the wife's proposed substantive application, I turn now to consider the principles applicable to the grant or refusal of an ``Anton Piller'' type order, in order to decide whether they are met in this case in relation to any (and which) of the proposed recipients of such an order.

In the ``Anton Piller'' case itself, Lord Denning, M.R., in considering the circumstances in which such an order should be made, said this (at 61):

``It seems to me that such an order can be made by a judge ex parte, but it should only be made where it is essential that the plaintiff should have inspection so that justice can be done between the parties; and when, if the defendant were forewarned, there is a grave danger that vital evidence will be destroyed, that papers will be burnt or lost or hidden, or taken beyond the jurisdiction, and so the ends of justice be defeated; and when the inspection would do no real harm to the defendant or his case.''

Ormrod, L.J., in the same case (at 62) said this:

``There are three essential preconditions for the making of such an order, in my judgment. First, there must be an extremely strong prima facie case. Secondly, the damage, potential or actual, must be very serious for the plaintiff. Thirdly, there must be clear evidence that the defendants have in their possession incriminating documents or things, and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such material before any application inter partes can be made.''

Addressing Ormrod, L.J.'s three ``essential preconditions'', I have already indicated my satisfaction that there is a strong prima facie case against the husband and QCMM for relief of the kind to be sought in the wife's proposed substantive application, exhibit 1. Assuming the existence of the third precondition, to which I shall refer in a moment, I think it is also clear that the damage, potential or actual, to the wife in the event that her proceedings were defeated by an act of one of the respondents sought to be prevented by the application, would be very serious. She stands to lose at least $360,000, being the difference between her entitlement under the original consent orders, and her entitlement under the later consent orders of 15 September, 1992, not to mention the costs which she has incurred, and will incur, in the proceedings settled by those orders and in the intended new proceedings.

The more difficult question in this case is whether the third of Ormrod, L.J.'s ``essential preconditions'' is met, and if so in respect of which of the persons or entities to whom the orders are sought to be directed.

Before dealing with that question, however, I think that there is another basis upon which the orders sought should not be made against two of the respondents named in the application. I refer to Kiskin and S.

Neither of those respondents is a respondent to the wife's proposed substantive application, nor was either a party to the consent orders of 15 September, 1992. I have not been referred to any authority which establishes that an ``Anton


Piller'' order has ever been or may be made against someone who is not, and will not be, a defendant in the existing or proposed substantive proceedings. To grant such an order against a non-party could therefore, I believe, be to introduce an unwarranted extension of the field of operation of what is, in any event, a very draconian procedure.Whilst it is true that the husband is a director and shareholder of Kiskin, and that QCMM is the only other shareholder, the fact remains that Kiskin is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders, and it has never been a party to any of the proceedings generated by the dispute between the husband and wife, nor will it be a respondent to the wife's proposed new proceedings. The reason why orders are sought against it, is that documents discovered by the Metway Bank in other related proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland, disclose that Kiskin provided security to that bank, in the form of a lien over a term deposit of $500,000 lodged by it with that bank, for the husband's obligation to make good any amounts which the bank was called upon by the wife to meet, pursuant to guarantees given by the bank at the husband's request for his obligations under the consent orders of 15 September, 1992.

Whilst it is understandable that the wife would want discovery, by Kiskin, of documents relevant to that provision of security, I think that there is no proper basis for making an ``Anton Piller'' order as distinct from an ordinary third-party production order in due course, against that company.

The same applies with equal force, in my opinion, to S. Although he clearly is, and has been, very closely involved in all of the relevant transactions and is a shareholder and director of most, if not all, of the relevant companies, he has never been a party to any of the proceedings and will not be a party to the wife's proposed new proceedings. There is no evidence that he has in his personal custody or control documents relevant to the issues raised by the wife's proposed application. In addition, he is a solicitor, and therefore an officer of the court. There is no justification for supposing that he would personally be likely to destroy or dispose of relevant documents so as to defeat or hinder the wife's proposed claim against other entities, before an application for third-party production of documents could be obtained in the wife's proposed new proceedings.

Accordingly, I decline to make the order sought against Kiskin and S.

As for the three remaining respondents, that is the husband, QCMM, and Taitolio, I am satisfied that there is clear evidence that each of them has, in his or its possession, custody, or control, documents which are likely to support the wife's allegations of fraud in relation to the supposed allotment of shares in QCMM on 5 June, 1992, and in relation to the husband's claimed incapacity, in June, 1992, to meet his obligations under the original consent order of 18 November, 1991.

It is almost inconceivable that documents relevant to those issues are not in the possession, custody, or control of the husband and QCMM, and as Taitolio was a shareholder of QCMM at the relevant time, and was offered but declined to take up part of the then proposed new share issue, it is at least highly probable that it, too, has possession, custody, or control of relevant documents.

In relation to those three respondents, I am also satisfied that there is a real possibility that if the orders sought against them are not now made, they may destroy or otherwise dispose of or hide such documents once they are served with the wife's proposed application, and before normal inter partes discovery can be obtained in those proceedings.

I have reached this conclusion on the basis that it has been demonstrated on the material before me that the husband and QCMM have been parties to, if not the instigators of, a clear misleading of this court on 22 June, 1992, and before that of the wife and her legal advisers, in relation to the supposed allotment of new shares in QCMM. In addition, paragraph 42 of Mr Mead's affidavit establishes that neither the husband nor QCMM has discovered, in related proceedings in the Supreme Court, a copy of the document which is annexure N to that affidavit, being a document discovered by the Metway Bank, the original of which was clearly written and signed by S for and on behalf of QCMM, relating specifically to the earnings of the husband as a director and shareholder of that company. Whilst there may be some innocent explanation for that failure, none is immediately apparent, and such a failure provides strong prima facie evidence that the husband and QCMM cannot be trusted to necessarily produce all relevant documents


through the normal processes of discovery in legal proceedings.As for Taitolio, there is no such evidence of non-disclosure by it of relevant documents. Nor could I be so readily satisfied that it too was a party to the apparent deception of the wife and the court in relation to the supposed share allotment of June, 1992.

However, as the husband holds 100 of the 113 issued shares in that company (although some of them appear to be held not beneficially by him) and it may, at least for present purposes I think, be regarded as his alter ego, and as it was a party to the proceedings which settled with the consent orders of 15 September, 1992, and will be a party to the wife's proposed new proceedings in this court, I am satisfied that there is at least a real risk that it too may seek to hide or dispose of relevant documents once it is served with the new proceedings.

I am satisfied that the orders sought by the wife against the husband, QCMM and Taitolio are generally in proper form, with all of the usual necessary safeguards, and supported by all of the appropriate undertakings. I accordingly propose to make those orders in respect of those three respondents, but for the reasons previously given, I decline to make them in respect of the other two respondents, namely Kiskin and S.

I will make orders in the form of the draft initialled by me and lodged with the papers. I direct that the issue of the order be expedited.

I further order that the applicant's costs of and incidental to these proceedings be reserved.

There does not need to be a formal order about this, but I dispense with compliance by the wife and Mr Mead with the requirement of O. 31, r. 10 to file written undertakings in Form 41A.

I will direct that my reasons for judgment be transcribed as soon as possible.







 
 

Executive Member of SRL-Resources, the Family Law People on the site (Look for the Avatars).   Be mindful what you post in the public areas. 
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